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Cavell’s “Moral Perfectionism” or
Emerson’s “Moral Sentiment”?
Joseph Urbas
1 As I have argued elsewhere (Urbas 2009),  what Stanley Cavell gives us is an Emerson
recast  in  a  form  more  congenial  to  postmodern  sensibilities.  And  nowhere  is  this
tendency more apparent than in his representation of Emersonian selfhood as detached
from any metaphysical ground. In the preface to Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, for
example,  Cavell  cautions  his  readers  against  “attaching  any  fixed,  metaphysical
interpretation of the idea of a self in [his] understanding of Emersonian Perfectionism”
(1990:  xxxi).  In  Quest  of  the  Ordinary  asserts,  similarly,  that  the  Emersonian  self  is
essentially free-floating:
[T]he idea of relying in Emerson’s word self-reliance knows its relation to the idea of
binding or  bonding in the word religion,  so  that  the self’s  (perpetual,  step-wise,
circle-wise) construction of the self, say in “Self-Reliance,” has to pass through an
idea of the self’s alliance with and rallying of itself, its self-authorizations, as on a
path, or succession, in the aftermath of religion’s dominance. (Cavell 1988: xii)
2 Cavell further asserts that Emerson abandoned any hope of a “resubstantializing the self,
the hope for which Hume and Kant, let us say, had shattered” (ibid.).1 It should be noted
too that the same strong aversion to metaphysics (“metaphysical suggestions I say I want
no part of”) and to the very idea of foundation (“an old thought for an old world”) leads
Cavell to exaggerate the power of skepticism and “groundlessness” in Emerson’s thought
(Cavell 1990: 13; 1989: 109; 1988: 5).
3 The overall result, though in perfect keeping with the footloose, nomadic, open-ended
spirit of an age that prefers “finding” to “founding” (Cavell 1989: 77-118) and writes its
own obituary to ontology (Putnam 2004: 71-85), is blatantly inconsistent with Emerson’s
own writings.
4 Whether we like it or not, the Emersonian ethical self does have a secure metaphysical
ground. In Emerson, the causality we share with nature is the foundation of autonomous
selfhood. Thus, very explicitly, “Self-Reliance”:
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We  first  share  the  life  by  which  things  exist,  and  afterwards  see  them  as
appearances  in  nature,  and  forget  that  we  have  shared  their  cause.  Here  is  the
fountain of action and of thought. Here are the lungs of that inspiration which giveth
man wisdom, and which cannot be denied without impiety and atheism. (Emerson
1971-2007: 2.37; my emphasis)
5 Quaint though such a doctrine may seem to us, Emerson’s conception of moral selfhood is
inseparable from his ontology; it is firmly grounded in what he calls “the moral cause of
the  world”  (“Morals,”  Emerson  1859;  2001:  2.133).  This  same causal  ground  is  the
“universal reliance” upon which Emersonian self-reliance is based. The “aboriginal Self”
into which the essay “Self-Reliance” inquires – “the aboriginal Self on which a universal
reliance may be grounded” – is “Supreme Cause” (Emerson 1971-2007: 2.37, 40). Causality
is the ultimate basis of selfhood for Emerson: “Only Cause can say I” (Emerson 1959-72:
2.248). The permanent enabling background of selfhood and ethical action is our secure
place in the causal and ontological continuum. As Emerson puts it in “The Over-Soul,”
there is “no bar or wall in the soul where man, the effect, ceases, and God, the cause,
begins. The walls are taken away.” (Emerson 1971-2007: 2.161). In the early as in the late
Emerson, ethical empowerment presupposes not a dualism but rather a deep continuity
or alignment of self and world: “the true man in every act has the Universe at his back”
(Emerson 1835 1960-82: 5.48); “whilst a man seeks good ends, he is strong by the whole
strength  of  nature”  (“Divinity  School  Address,”  Emerson  1838;  1971-2007:  1.79);  “all
power is of one kind, a sharing of the nature of the world” (“Power,” Emerson 1860;
1971-2007: 6.30).
6 It  is  the Emersonian “moral sentiment” that substantiates this continuity and shared
causality with the world. The moral sentiment “speaks to every man the law after which
the Universe was made” (Emerson 1903-04: 11.486). It is “all we know of the Cause of
Causes” (Emerson 1959-72: 2.352). As our felt, vital link to Being, the moral sentiment
makes us at home in the universe and secures our universality as moral selves: “It puts us
in place. It centres, it concentrates us. It puts us at the heart of nature, where we belong;
in the cabinet of Science and of Causes; there, where all the wires terminate which hold
the  world  in  magnetic  communication,  and  so  converts  us  into  universal  beings”
(“Morals,” Emerson 2001: 2.133). Emerson’s ethical doctrine thus finds its metaphysical
foundation  in  his  causal  monism  (thereby  providing  a  perfect  illustration  of  Hilary
Putnam’s  thesis,  in  Ethics  without  Ontology,  that  an  ethics  with  ontology  entails  a
commitment to monism, Putnam 2004: 18-9). To quote the conclusion of the late lecture
on “Morals” (which contains, as we shall see, Emerson’s revision of Kant): “You will see
the results of inquiry into the moral nature: it is the same fact existing as sentiment and as
will in the mind, which works in nature as irresistible law, exerting influence in nations,
intelligent beings, or down in the kingdoms of brute or of chemical nature” (Emerson
2001: 2.139; my emphasis). As this quotation shows, Emerson sees the universe as a causal
and moral continuum. The moral sentiment is not limited to human nature or individual
psychology; on the contrary, as a manifestation of universal causality, it has ontological
status. Which is why Emerson uses the term indifferently to designate both the sentiment
within and the law without. For him the two are ultimately one. This fundamental causal
and  moral  continuity  of  inside and  outside,  self  and  world,  is  something  Emerson
emphasized consistently throughout his career. Here is an early expression of it, from
Essays: First Series (1841):
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All things are moral. That soul which within us is a sentiment, outside of us is a law.
We  feel  its  inspiration;  out  there  in  history  we  can  see  its  fatal  strength.
(“Compensation,” 1971-2007: 2.60)
7 And now, two decades later, “Worship” (The Conduct of Life, 1860):
Skepticism is unbelief in cause and effect. A man does not see, that, as he eats, so he
thinks: as he deals, so he is, and so he appears; he does not see, that his son is the
son of his thoughts and of his actions; that fortunes are not exceptions but fruits;
that relation and connection are not somewhere and sometimes, but everywhere and always
; no miscellany, no exemption, no anomaly, – but method, and an even web; and
what comes out, that was put in. As we are, so we do; and as we do, so is it done to
us; we are the builders of our fortunes; cant and lying and the attempt to secure a
good which does not belong to us, are, once for all, balked and vain. But, in the
human mind, this tie of fate is made alive. The law is the basis of the human mind.
In us, it is inspiration; out there in Nature, we see its fatal strength. We call it the
moral sentiment. (1971-2007: 6.117; emphasis added)
8 The Emersonian law of compensation rules a universal order that is moral as well as
causal.  “Emerson  equated  ethics  with  being”  (Van  Cromphout  1999:  35).  The  essay
“Compensation,” where Emerson defines virtue as an “influx” from “the aboriginal abyss
of real Being,” makes this equation quite explicit: “In a virtuous action, I properly am; in a
virtuous action I add to the world.” Likewise, “Self-Reliance” identifies virtue with reality
and  causal  substance:  “Self-existence  is  the  attribute  of  the  Supreme  Cause,  and  it
constitutes the measure of good by the degree in which it enters into all lower forms. All
things real are so by so much virtue as they contain” (1971-2007: 2.70, 71, 40).2 “Spiritual
Laws”  makes  the  equation  still  more  explicit,  if  that  were  possible:  “Virtue  is  the
adherence in action to the nature of things, and the nature of things makes it prevalent.
It consists in a perpetual substitution of being for seeming, and with sublime propriety
God is described as saying, I AM” (2.92).
9 Clearly, then, Emerson’s ethics is firmly grounded in his ontology. The moral sentiment
provides a metaphysical foundation for ethical selfhood and assures us – notwithstanding
recurrent bouts of skepticism – that we are fundamentally at home in a world governed
by universal moral and causal law, a world where relation and connection are not somewhere
and sometimes, but everywhere and always.
10 What is especially problematic in the Cavellian thematics of “Emersonian Perfectionism”
is  the  blithe  disregard  for  the  core  doctrine  of  the  moral  sentiment,  which  David
M. Robinson  has  rightly  called  Emerson’s  “bedrock  of  consistency”  and  “the  most
important point of continuity in his thinking from first to last” (Robinson 1993: 7, 195).
The moral sentiment, Emerson insists at the close of his essay on the “representative
skeptic,” “never forfeits its supremacy” (“Montaigne, or the Skeptic,” 1971-2007: 4.103). It
gives ethical selfhood a secure metaphysical ground in “the moral cause of the world”
and provides what Emerson himself identifies unequivocally, in the same essay, as the
“solution” to skepticism – a problem which is not, as Cavell would have it (Cavell 1989:
79),  “unsolvable” in the later writings.  The paragraph from “Worship” quoted above,
which begins by defining skepticism as “unbelief in cause and effect” and ends on a bold
assertion of the “fatal strength” of the moral sentiment, confirms this idea a decade later.
And  as  Emerson  insisted  yet  again  in  “The  Sovereignty  of  Ethics”  (1878):  “The
commanding fact which I never do not see, is the sufficiency of the moral sentiment”
(1903-04: 10.212).
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11 The consequence of  this  centrality would appear obvious,  and may be stated simply:
When it comes to Emerson’s ethics and his vision of human perfectibility,3 reference to the
moral  sentiment  is  not  optional,  even  if  we  find  the  doctrine  dissatisfactory  (e.g.  Van
Cromphout 1999,  34-5,  47,  57).  We cannot speak of  Emerson’s “moral  perfectionism,”
much less  of  its  constitution  (Cavell  1990),  without  considering his  core  metaphysical
doctrine.  Here  is  the  fatal  flaw in  Cavell’s  account,  his  fundamental  departure  from
Emerson, and the source of a number of unfortunate confusions.
12 First among these I would cite Cavell’s overemphasis on skepticism, and on the “loss of
ground”  or  “sense  of  groundlessness”  that  is  its  “truth”  (Cavell  1990:  61;  1988:  5).
Abandoning what he considers an illusory resubstantialization of the subject, Cavell seeks
to preserve skepticism (one of philosophy’s principal “tasks,” Cavell 1988: 5), to privilege
finding over founding or abandonment over inhabitation (Cavell 1981: 137-8) – in a word,
to  enlist  Emerson  into  this  perfectionist  program.  “Metaphysical  suggestions”  are
something that Cavell says he wants “no part of” (Cavell 1990: 13). Hence if “founding”
there is, it “reaches no farther than each issue of finding.” Or as he puts it elsewhere in
the landmark lecture “Finding as Founding”: “The existence of one of these worlds of life
depends on our finding ourselves there. They have no foundation otherwise” (Cavell 1989:
114, 96-7).  With Cavell,  this much seems clear, then: no metaphysics. Where Emerson
himself  is  concerned,  however,  there is  a  major problem,  for  the whole point  of  his
particularly emphatic reminder in “Self-Reliance” is to insist that though we “forget” its
existence, a secure ground for selfhood in our shared causality with nature is always
ready to hand: Here is the fountain of action and of thought. Thoreau concludes similarly in
Walden – itself an earnest metaphysical search for a “hard bottom” or “point d’appui” –
that “there is a solid bottom every where” (1971: 98,  330).4 The movement known as
Transcendentalism was a quest for permanent grounds for being, selfhood, and religious
faith. Its distinctive “ontological turn” was one of the things that made the movement
“new.”
13 A second and related confusion lies in the identification of the metaphysical ground with
fixity.  Over  and against  this,  Cavell  proposes  an  anti-metaphysical  alternative  in  the
Emersonian principle of onwardness. As appealing as the choice may seem, especially for
the “open-ended thematics” of perfectionism (Cavell 1990: 4), the terms of the opposition,
as  presented,  do  not  apply  to  Emerson’s  philosophy.  The  onwardness  that  Cavell
celebrates at the end of “Thinking of Emerson” as proof of a bold abandonment of the
“metaphysical  fixture”  is  in  reality  an  ontological  necessity  –  “the  necessity  of
progression or onwardness in each creature,” as Emerson calls it in an 1845 Journal entry
(Emerson  1960-82:  9.301).5 In  “Experience”  Emerson  dubs  this  the  “onward  trick  of
nature” (Emerson 1971-2007: 2.32), which Cavell, in a piece of hedging characteristic of
his approach, “guesses” is not realism exactly” (1981: 126-7).6 Of course it is. Realism is
exactly what it is. Onwardness is a trick of nature. It is evidence of the “flowing law” of
causality that rules throughout the universe, the law that is not somewhere and sometimes,
but everywhere and always, the universal law to which even the skeptic must finally submit
(Emerson 1960-82:  9.295),  since the moral  sentiment never  forfeits  its  supremacy.  What
Emerson’s dynamic, causationist metaphysics provides is precisely the sort of philosophy
he  called  for  in  the  “Montaigne”  essay  –  “one  of  fluxions  and  mobility”  (Emerson
1971-2007:  4.91).  The same philosophy informs the later essay “Power,” which makes
wordplay do the serious work of metaphysics by defining self-reliance, “original action,”
and success in life as our ability, when faced with a world moving at a dizzying pace, to
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“enter cordially into the game, and whirl with the whirling world.”7 Nearly two decades
earlier “The Transcendentalist” had decribed the world as “spinning away” like a “wild
balloon” (1.202). But in the midst of all the furious agitation Emerson discerns order, in
the figure of Law – “Law riding sure through wild and prodigious motion” (1959-72: 3.28).
No false problem of “fixtures” here, but rather a permanent foundation for selfhood and
an ever-present source of power and movement. In Emerson the metaphysical ground is
not synonymous with fixity. Emerson agreed with his friend Cyrus Bartol, who put the
idea nicely when he said, “God, who is my Cause, is my Causeway” (Bartol 1872: 406).
Small wonder, then, that Emerson should conclude “Self-Reliance” on an exhortation to
deal exclusively with “Cause and Effect, the chancellors of God,” or that his considered
response to the skeptic should be: “Truth or the connection of cause and effect alone
interests  us”  (Emerson  1971-2007:  2.50,  4.96).  Emerson’s  philosophy  overcomes  the
opposition between the “fixed” metaphysical foundation and the principle of movement
by making causation the ultimate ground of being and selfhood. Universal causation thus
embodies “home” and “onwardness” at  the same time.  “Let  us  sit  at  home with the
cause,” says Emerson in “Self-Reliance” (2.41). We find our home in “that which affirms
itself to be the Cause of all” (Emerson 1959-72: 3.29).
14 These  last  quotations  point  to  a  third  misunderstanding,  here  again  concerning  the
metaphysical ground. Perfectionism expresses Cavell’s conviction that the very idea of a
“ground” has to be somewhow rethought, or made “more human” (Cavell 1989: 9). Cavell
appears  to  think  that  to  posit  a  ground for  selfhood  elsewhere  than  in  the  task  of
onwardness  itself  is  somehow  to  imperil  our  humanity.  This  position,  whatever  its
pertinence to Cavell’s own philosophy, makes no sense as a commentary on Emerson. The
Emersonian moral subject is fundamentally at home in the world, and in this particular
regard there is –  Cavell’s  claims notwithstanding (Cavell  1989:  79)  –  no fundamental
difference between Nature and a later essay like “Experience.” Both emphasize man’s
close kinship with “dearest nature, strong and kind,” to quote a line from the motto to
this last essay (Emerson 1971-2007: 3.25). Emerson’s critique of idealism in Nature,  for
example, should be understood to include not only the Berkeleian denial of the existence
of matter – the obvious target – but also the Kantian opposition of mind and nature:
“Nature is so pervaded with human life, that there is something of humanity in all, and in
every particular. But this theory makes nature foreign to me, and does not account for
that consanguinity which we acknowledge to it” (1.38). This “consanguinity” or shared
life is what Emerson will later identify in “Self-Reliance” as shared causality. The causal
ground of universal reliance is not felt by Emerson to be a threat to his humanity or
selfhood but rather their very condition. Thus Emerson, in an 1837 journal entry: “A certain
wandering light comes to me which I instantly perceive to be the Cause of Causes. It
transcends all proving. It is itself the ground of being; and I see that it is not one & I
another, but this is the life of my life” (Emerson 1960-82: 5.337). As the “Montaigne” essay
shows, the moral sentiment – the “solution” to the “superficial” problem of skepticism –
bears witness to this consanguinity by allowing us to feel our kinship to the thought that
is “parent of the universe” and dynamic principle of all being:
The final solution in which Skepticism is lost,  is,  in the moral sentiment, which
never  forfeits  its  supremacy.  All  moods  may  be  safely  tried,  and  their  weight
allowed to all objections: the moral sentiment as easily outweighs them all, as any
one. This is the drop which balances the sea. I play with the miscellany of facts and
take those superficial  views which we call  Skepticism but I  know that they will
presently appear to me in that order which makes Skepticism impossible. A man of
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thought must feel the thought that is parent of the universe: that the masses of
nature do undulate and flow. (4.103)
15 A final difficulty centers on the Emersonian theme of “nextness.” Cavell misdescribes
both this and onwardness as “tasks” (Cavell 2005: 228-9; 1981: 138). Tasks for perfectionism,
no doubt, but not for Emerson. Like onwardness, nextness characterizes our spontaneous
life and being, our natural place in the causal continuum; it is not, strictly speaking, an
object of effort. We are always at home with the cause, whether we realize it or not, even
though the powers immediately available to us have been concealed by familiarity and
conformism (“wrapped up under the coarse mattings of custom,” Emerson 1971-2007:
3.167), even though we live and move among appearances and “forget” that we share “the
life by which things exist.” To make nextness or onwardness a task, as Cavell suggests,
would be  quite  literally  to  make  work  for  oneself,  in  an act  of  willfulness,  of  needless
meddling in the natural order of things. Emerson, by contrast, is a stern and consistent
critic of voluntarism in matters ethical  and political.  To those who would “represent
virtue as a struggle,” he replies: “there is no merit in the matter” (2.78). Political reform
movements commit a similar voluntarist error – an error that Cavell himself identifies at
the end of “Experience” (Cavell 1990: 20; 2004: 139, 141) but without acknowledging that
the very basis of Emerson’s critique is his belief that the true source of empowerment and
realization lies in the world, not in an individual subject seen, through the skeptic’s eyes,
as  divorced  from  it  (Cavell  1989:  95).  As  Emerson  remarks  wryly  in  “New  England
Reformers”  (a  lecture  that  closes,  like  “Experience,”  with  fitting  emphasis  on  our
empowering position in the causal continuum): “we need not assist the administration of
the universe” (3.166). In “Spiritual Laws,” which insists likewise that “our moral nature is
vitiated by any interference of our will” and points to “the preponderance of nature over
will in all practical life,” Emerson denounces voluntarist meddling as interference in the
natural order of things:
The lesson is forcibly taught by these observations that our life might be much
easier and simpler than we make it; that the world might be a happier place than it
is; that there is no need for struggles, convulsions, and despairs, of the wringing of
the  hands  and the  gnashing of  the  teeth;  that  we miscreate our  own evils.  We
interfere with the optimism of nature, for, whenever we get this vantage ground of
the past, or of a wiser mind in the pre- sent, we are able to discern that we are
begirt with laws which execute themselves. (1971-2007: 2.78, 79; emphasis added)
16 As “The American Scholar” had famously declared, “the highest spiritual cause” is always
nearby, lurking everywhere – in “the common,” “the familiar,” and “the low,” in the
“suburbs and extremities of nature,” in the merest “trifle” (1.67-68). Thus, also, Walden:
Nearest  to  all  things  is  that  power  which  fashions  their  being.  Next  to  us  the
grandest laws are continually being executed. Next to us is not the workman whom
we have hired, with whom we love so well to talk, but the workman whose work we
are. (Thoreau 1971: 134)
17 Nextness is not a task, then, any more than onwardness is. Cavellian perfectionism sees as
requiring work that which requires, in reality, a form of obedience or passiveness.8 It is
no accident that one of Emerson’s favorite lines from Bacon is Imperat parendo: “Command
by  obeying”  (Emerson  1990-94:  2.332;  2001:  1.182).  Here  the  attitude  is  not  one  of
voluntarism but of piety: “By piety alone, by conversing with the cause of nature, is [man]
safe and commands it” (“The Method of Nature,” Emerson 1971-2007: 1.131). It is not
nextness  that  requires  effort  but what  Emerson stigmatizes  as  “roving”  –  a  form of
private willfulness, of resistance or opposition to the Supreme Will. Thus the “Divinity
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School Address,” in a passage where Emerson also develops his causal monist doctrine of
the moral sentiment:
[T]he world is not the product of manifold power, but of one will, of one mind; and
[…] one mind is everywhere active, in each ray of the star, in each wavelet of the
pool; and whatever opposes that will, is everywhere baulked and baffled, because
things are made so, and not otherwise […] All things proceed out of the same spirit,
and all things conspire with it. Whilst a man seeks good ends, he is strong by the
whole strength of nature. In so far as he roves from these ends, he bereaves himself
of power, of auxiliaries; his being shrinks out of all remote channels, he becomes
less and less, a mote, a point, until absolute badness is absolute death. (1971-2007:
1.78-79)
18 Willfulness throws us out of our natural home, out of our “parallelism to the course of
thought” (2.79), out of our alignment with the causal power of nature. “My wilful actions
and  acquisitions  are  but  roving,” Emerson  declares  in  “Self-Reliance.”  Hence  the
subsequent exhortation, in the same essay: “let us not rove; let us sit at home with the
cause” (Emerson 1971-2007: 2.37, 41). The essay “Spiritual Laws” is right: our life might
indeed be much easier and simpler than we make it:  “We need only obey” (2.81).  The
successful man is a conduit for the causal force, a “conductor of the causative influence”
(to  borrow  a  phrase  from  Coleridge’s  Aids  to  Reflection,  a  favorite  among  the
Transcendentalists,  1993:  267).  In Emerson he is a “visible conductor”;  his object,  “to
suffer the law to traverse his whole being without obstruction” (Emerson 1971-2007: 2.79,
93). We are here, as Emerson says at the close of the Montaigne essay, “not to work, but to
be worked upon” (4.105).  With “our miserable interferences” (2.82),  we have already
taken on far too many needless “tasks.” Why multiply them, when it  is  not positive,
painstaking effort but simple alignment that is needed? All we need to do is to sit at home
with the cause, to go with the flow, to “whirl with the whirling world”:
Why need you choose so painfully your place, and occupation, and associates, and
modes of action, and of entertainment? Certainly there is a possible right for you
that precludes the need of balance and wilful election. For you there is a reality, a
fit place and congenial duties. Place yourself in the middle of the stream of power
and wisdom which animates all whom it floats, and you are without effort impelled
to truth, to right, and a perfect contentment. Then you put all gainsayers in the
wrong. Then you are the world, the measure of right, of truth, of beauty. (“Spiritual
Laws,” 2.81; emphasis added)
19 Ontological alignment, as it turns out, is the key to Emerson’s revision of Kantian moral
philosophy. Here again, Cavell’s dogged refusal of metaphysics leads to distortions. Much
the best summary of Cavell’s view of the relation between the two thinkers appears in
Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome:
The doubleness in Kant’s two standpoints,  or two worlds,  that the human takes
upon itself, or lives in, is, I think, understandable as a projection of reflexiveness.
The intelligible world would be the scene of human activeness, the sensuous world
that of human passiveness. Then Kant’s moral imperative, his “ought,” which the
doubleness  of  human  habitation  is  meant  to  explain,  or  picture,  is  also  an
explanation, or shows the place for one, of the self’s identity, that it is the same self
that is  active and passive.  […] My reading of  Emerson takes him […] as looking
everywhere to inherit Kant’s insight without his architectonic (he isn’t the only
one);  to  account,  for  example,  for  “constraint”  without  the  conditions  of  the
imperative “ought” and so without Kant’s fixed differences between the intelligible
and  the  sensous  realms,  between  the  imposition  of  the  categories  and  the
receptions of their intuitions – departures from Kant that will  require Emerson to
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find freedom and knowledge as much in the passive (patience, passion) as in the
active dimensions of selfhood. (Cavell 1990: xxxv-xxxvi)
20 There is frankly much to admire here in the way of philosophical insight, particularly in
the  conclusion,  but  Emerson’s  differences  with  Kant  need  to  be  stated  more
perspicuously.  Whether  or  not  Emerson had Kant  specifically  in mind in the closing
paragraph of “Experience” (I am not convinced he did), Cavell is certainly right to see him
as rejecting the “fixed differences” between the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds.
But, we need to be clear about the reason for the rejection. If in Emerson the worlds “of
nature and understanding” are not “perennially,  ineluctably in metaphysical combat”
(Cavell 2004: 141), it is not because he has abandoned metaphysics for perfectionism, it is
because  he  is  a  causal  monist.  For  him there  are  not  “two worlds.”  Cavell  portrays
Emerson as  seeking  to  transform the  Kantian  idea  of  constraint  into  a  perfectionist
notion  of  onwardness:  “this  Emersonian  constraint  is  precisely  not  expressed  as  an
’ought.’ Rather it is as like a desire as like a law; Emerson figures it as a form of attraction, as
if to my further self” (Cavell 2004: 140, my emphasis; cf. also 32). By contrast, the “true”
or “grounded” self – “a fixed, metaphysical interpretation of the idea of a self” – is one
that Cavell has dismissed consistently for over two decades, from “Thinking of Emerson”
and Conditions to Cities of Words, as “beyond desire, beyond change” (Cavell 1981: 137-8;
1990: xxxi, xxxiv; 2004: 140) – as excluding, in other words, any principle of onwardness.
But the constraint of Emersonian onwardness is not as like a desire as like a law. We can
dispense with the circumlocutions: it is a law – a law of being, a law that grounds an ethics
with ontology.
21 Cavell  cites  the  Kantian  Categorical  Imperative  in  a  discussion  of  what  he  calls
“constitutional judgment” in the essay “Fate” (Cavell 1995: 35-6), declaring vaguely and
unhelpfully that Emerson is appealing to “something of the kind” when he speaks of the
“insight”  that  “throws us  on the party and interest of  the Universe,  against  all  and
sundry; against ourselves, as much as others” (Emerson 1971-2007: 6:14). The insight in
question is in fact nothing of the kind, simply because, as yet another expression of the
moral sentiment (which Emerson discusses three paragraphs later in the essay),  Kant
would have considered it heteronomous (Van Cromphout 1999: 47). But it is less to “Fate”
than to the late lecture “Morals” that we should turn for Emerson’s most explicit revision
of Kant. The ontological origin – our first sharing of “the life by which things exist” – also
turns out to be a moral end in Emerson’s recasting of the Categorical Imperative. Only
individuals  acting  in  accordance  with  “central  and  constitutional  reason,”  only
individuals who embody virtue – that is to say, who substitute being for seeming – may be
called real:
I choose to will with reason, the right of all souls, and not for the pleasure of me. So
deep is our sense of the necessity of resting on nature and of universal motives,
that, we call such, real men; – whilst men acting for by-ends, or not from central
and constitutional reason, false and superficial. This acting after your constitution
and for that which is always the same, as, justice goodness, human freedom, and
benefit, – we call reality. (2001: 2.134)
22 For Emerson, universal ends are not formulated by an isolated, sovereign subject, in the
exercise of its noumenal freedom; they are an integral part of nature. Hence the crucial
pairing of necessities – and, even more crucially, their specific order: resting on nature and 
universal motives. Our dependence on nature, on the causal ground of selfhood, is prior.
Nature and the universal ends—the ends which constitute the “strict” moral counterpart
of “universal material force” (Emerson’s term, 2001: 2.133) – are the ontological ground of
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all moral action, and secure our reality as moral beings. What Emerson calls above the
“central and constitutional reason” is not Kant’s pure practical reason; rather, it is the
individual’s precise point of alignment “with the axis of things”:  “There is somewhat
constitutional to him to do, somewhat which he does with joy, and with the consent of all
men and things,  and which  nature  backs  him in  doing”  (Emerson 2001:  2:133,  134).
Resolving the conundrum of how to make the pure reason practical (Cavell 1989: 95; 2004:
139) is irrelevant to Emerson, a causal monist and champion of the moral sentiment. As “a
man of  thought,”  he feels  his  immediate kinship to the empowering thought that  is
“parent  of  the  universe.”  As  an  ethical  philosopher,  Emerson  is  not  interested  in  a
Kantian “contracausal autonomy” (Schneewind 1998: 3) – there can be no such thing in
his philosophy – but rather in the precise point of coincidence or alignment with the axis
of  things  that  gives  human action its  efficacy,  its  substance or  grounding in reality.
“Acting for by-ends” – roving, in other words – is not only a violation of some abstract,
universal principle of morality or reason; it robs us of part of our being: “we become less
and less, a mote, a point,” to recall the words of “The Divinity School Address” quoted
above. By ignoring universality of motive and acting willfully, simply “for the pleasure of
me,” I have less of a purchase on reality be- cause I myself have less substance; and as a
result (since for Emerson substance is cause),  I  also have less freedom: “Reality rules
Destiny. They may well fear fate who have any infirmity of habit and aim. But he who
rests  on what  he is,  has  a  destiny above destiny,  and can make mouths at  fortune”
(Emerson 2001: 2.133).
23 Moral autonomy in Emerson is resting or relying on what we are, on the reality of our
individual being as it meshes with the causal power of material and spiritual being as a
whole.  Morality for Emerson is  thus action “according to nature.” Consequently,  our
moral  freedom is  not  noumenal  in  the Kantian sense,  in  the sense that  it  stands  in
opposition to the necessity of the causal order, but is always grounded in and continuous
with  the  powers  of  nature.  The  Emersonian  moral  subject  must  have  this  direct
grounding in “universal  force,” without which virtue is  otiose and “goodness dies in
wishes” (Emerson 1971-2007: 6.16). Thus Emersonian autonomy is not “contracausal” but
on the contrary firmly rooted in his causal monist metaphysics. Self-reliance is grounded
in “universal reliance” on the Cause. It is, we might say, however paradoxical it sounds, a
“morality as self-governance” based on a “morality as obedience” (Schneewind 1998: 4).9
Emerson saw no contradiction between the two. If in the motto to “Experience” the weak,
unprepossessing figure of “little man” turns out to be the “founder” who rules over “the
lords of life,” that is because his reliable guide – “dearest nature, strong and kind” –
declares him such (Emerson 1971-2007: 3.25). Power is always a “sharing of the nature of
the world” (6.30).
24 Onwardness, nextness, preserving skepticism, humanizing the ground, transforming the
idea of constraint – these may be “tasks” for perfectionism; they are not for Emerson. At
the end of the day, it is perfectionism’s resolutely anti-metaphysical vocation that makes
it peculiarly un-Emersonian. One might argue that when Cavell is philosophizing “after”
Emerson – or even openly “fantasizing for” him (Emerson 1989: 107), the approximations,
hedgings, and circumlocutions – the I guesses, the not exactlys, the as likes, the something of
the kinds – are not only expressions of prudence or uncertainty but also ways of avoiding
the disagreeable  fact  of  Emerson’s  strong metaphysical  commitment.  The conceptual
consequences of this avoidance are a misrepresentation of Emersonian selfhood as free-
floating,  a  persistent  mislocation  of  the  effort  of  the  moral  subject,  and  a  marked
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tendency to substitute the social (or linguistic) for the metaphysical, as a possible though
of course “unfixed” ground for onwardness. Thus, on this last point, Cities of Words: “In
Emerson’s words mankind is still pictured as living in two worlds, but the worlds now are
not  those  of  nature  and  of  understanding, perennially,  ineluctably  in  metaphysical
combat, but those of society as it stands and as it may become – hidden in, in struggle
with, the present” (Cavell 2004: 141).10 Cavell’s aversion to metaphysics also explains the
glaring inconsistency noted in passing above – on the one hand, his superb insight into
“the power of passiveness”; on the other, his stubborn refusal to see exactly the same
power at work in a passage he considers a locus classicus of perfectionism, the conclusion
of “Experience,” which defines practical empowerment as a shifting of the burden of
realization onto a world that is here to assist us, not we it.11 Here is the true romance of
practical  power  that  Emerson  continued  to  celebrate  in  his  late  lecture  “Perpetual
Forces” (1862): “Like the hero in our nursery tale, who has one servant who eats slices of
granite rocks, and another who can hear the grass grow, and a third who can run to
Babylon in half an hour, so man in Nature is surrounded by a gang of friendly giants who
can do harder stints than these” (Emerson 2001: 2.289). No wonder Emerson loved the
poet George Herbert’s lines, “More servants wait on man/Than he’ll  take notice of” (
Nature,  Emerson 1971-2007: 1.41;  “Perpetual Forces,” 2001:2.289).  Power always means
sharing  the  nature  of  the  world,  “borrowing  the  might  of  the  elements”  (Emerson
1903-04: 7.14).
25 Whether  we  like  it  or  not,  Emerson  is  a  strong  –  Putnam would  say  “inflationary”
(Putnam 2004: 17-22) – ontologist who proposes an ethics akin to rational intuitionism, an
ethics with ontology,  an ethics which sees moral  action as necessarily rooted in “the
nature of things” (“Ethics,” Emerson 1959-72: 2.144). Whether we like it or not – even if
we consider, here again with Putnam, that “monism is a bad outlook in every area of
human life” (1990: 131), Emerson’s core doctrine of the moral sentiment is indeed rooted
in a causal monism. This is the Emerson we must clearly acknowledge before claiming
him as one of our own.
26 The real  question for us,  then,  is  which will  it  be? Cavell’s  “moral  perfectionism” or
Emerson’s “moral sentiment”? We cannot have both.
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NOTES
1. Gould  describes  perfectionist  selfhood  as  “a  continual  undermining  of  a  false  ideal  of
wholeness” (Gould 1998: 104). See also Mulhall’s summary of the perfectionist self “as ineluctably
split or doubled,” as “conditioned by an ineliminable internal doubleness,” with “attained” and
“unattained but attainable” sides (Mulhall 1996: 13-4; cf. also Mulhall 1994: 256-7, 298-9).
2. The equation was by no means new to  Emerson,  who identified virtue in  an early  (1829)
sermon as “of the very nature and substance of God Himself” (1989-92: 2.90). Self-reliance may be
described as the best resemblance we have, as creatures lower down the scale of being, to the
self-existence that characterizes the Supreme Cause.
3. Though perhaps a useful distinction from our late perspective, one of Cavell’s stated reasons
for adopting the word perfectionism – that,  unlike perfectibility,  it  embraces onwardness and
refuses a final state for selfhood (Cavell 1990: 3, 12-3; 2004: 445-7; 2005: 121) – is a distinction
without  a  difference  for Emerson’s  Unitarian  cultural  milieu,  where  the  ideal  of  perfection
carried no hint of a term to the ongoing process of self-development. Emerson’s teacher William
Ellery Channing described the path leading “onward to perfection” as properly “interminable”
(Channing 1896: 965); his Transcendentalist friend Cyrus Bartol, who declared “the essence of
faith” to be “advance,” put it more trenchantly: “The infidel is he that asserts finality anywhere,
makes a term of any achievement or conception, sees or puts a block in the eternal road. To
affirm any stop or period is unbelief” (Bartol 1872: 73, 223). For a critique of Cavell’s “aversion”
to Christianity, see Mulhall (1994: 282-312); on religion, see also Hammer (Hammer 2002: 145-6).
4. Cavell writes off Thoreau’s search for foundations as mere joking (Cavell 1989: 109).
5. This journal entry is  part of a series of notations on skepticism that constitute Emerson’s
preparatory work for the Montaigne lecture.
6. For  another  example  of  hedging,  due  to  a  similar  reluctance  to  acknowledge  Emerson’s
realism,  see  the  treatment  of  the  closing  paragraph  of  “Experience”  (a  locus  classicus  of
perfectionism),  and  in  particular  the  last  line  (“the  true  romance  which  the  world  exists  to
realize, will be the transformation of genius into practical power,” Emerson 1971-2007: 3.49, my
emphasis), which according to Cavell “does not exactly shift the burden from the genius onto the
world” (Cavell 1989: 95, my emphasis; cf. also 1990: 13; 1989: 10). Here I would reply: of course it
does. The shift is precisely what makes the romance true. See also the rather telling omission of
the crucial adjective in the same passage of “Thinking of Emerson” where Cavell eschews the
“metaphysical fixture” (1981:128), as well as in Conditions (Cavell 1990: xxi).
7. Emerson (1971-2007:  6.29;  cf.  also 1990-94:  1.50).  The second paragraph of “Power,” which
builds up to the vision of the “whirling world,” is an excellent illustration of Emerson’s causal
monism: “All successful men have agreed in one thing; – they were causationists. They believed
that things went not by luck, but by law; that there was not a weak or a cracked link in the chain
that joins the first and last of things. A belief in causality, or strict connexion between every
pulse-beat  and  the  principle  of  being,  and,  in  consequence,  belief  in  compensation,  or,  that
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nothing is got for nothing, – characterizes all valuable minds, and must control every effort that
is made by an industrious one” (Emerson 1971-2007: 6.28-29; see also “The American Scholar,”
written over two decades earlier, 1.67-68). It is worth re-emphasizing that though Emerson’s is a
“whirling  world,”  where  “everything  tilts  and  rocks”  (“The  Method  of  Nature,”  1.121),  it  is
governed “not by luck, but by law.” And therein lies Emerson’s optimistic, causationist response
to Montaigne’s melancholy vision of the world as a branloire  pérenne (a world that “eternally
turns  round,”  in  Emerson’s  favorite  Cotton  translation  of  the  Essais,  1892:  2.268).  Emerson
responds  to  Montaigne’s  famous  declaration  that  we  have  “no  communication  with  Being”
(1.617) by appealing to the moral sentiment – that is to say, to “that Thought through which we
communicate with absolute nature” (“The Transcendentalist,” 1971-2007: 1.182).
8. This confusion is rather surprising, in light of Cavell’s superb insight into what he calls “the
power  of  passiveness”  in  Emerson (Cavell  1989:  114-5).  I  return  to  this  inconsistency  in  my
conclusion.
9. It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  roughly  from  the  Divinity  School  Address  onward,
Emersonian “morality as obedience” detaches itself  from the idea of a personal God. For the
definitive  expression  of  Emerson’s  controversial  doctrine  of  impersonality,  which  set  the
Unitarian establishment against him, see the conclusion of “Fate,” where he pleads for a new
form of worship: “Let us build altars to the Beautiful Necessity” (Emerson 1971-2007: 6.26).
10. In  a  similar  move,  Stanley  Bates’s  useful  description  of  the  “internal  dialectic”  of
perfectionist  selfhood  opens  out  onto  a  form  of  loose  and  presumably  non-binding  social
determination: “What perfectionism wants is the possibility of self-transformation according to
an ideal  that  is  internal  to  the self’s  constitution rather than one that  comes from without.
However,  we  need  to  remember  that  what  is  ‘internal’  and  what  comes  ‘from  without’  are
themselves not fixed and permanent categories. If the transfiguration of any particular state of
the self is to be possible, then these categories will be capable of transformation. Of course, part
of every state of my self is how I relate to the society that has helped to form me” (Bates 2003:
42). This seems consistent with Cavell’s own writings, which emphasize the social dimension and
“the importance to perfectionism of the friend” (Cavell 1990: xxxii). On language as ground, see
Greenham’s  Cavellian reading of  “Self-Reliance”  as  “an attempt  to  found the  self  on words”
(Greenham 2007: 277). To a large extent, it seems, the “work” of onwardness is to be performed
in  or  through language  and writing  –  in  Emerson,  through the  essay.  To  quote  “Finding  as
Founding”: “The step I am taking here is to receive the work of ‘Experience’ as transforming or
replacing founding with finding and to ask what our lives would look like if the work is realized”
(Cavell 1989: 109).
11. In Cavell’s view, by contrast, the closing line of “Experience” expresses the “unsolvability” of
skepticism and “says the world exists as it were for its own reasons” (Cavell 1989: 79).
ABSTRACTS
What is properly Emersonian about moral perfectionism? Perhaps the best answer is: not much.
Stanley Cavell’s signature concept, which claims close kinship to Emerson’s ethical philosophy,
seems upon careful examination to be rather far removed from it. Once we get past the broad,
unproblematic appeals to Emerson’s “unattained but attainable self,” and consider the specific
content and implications of perfectionism, the differences between the two thinkers become too
substantive – and too fraught with serious misunderstandings – to be ignored. It is above all
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Cavell’s complete disregard for the Emersonian “moral sentiment” that jeopardizes his claim to
be a continuator of Emerson’s legacy in ethical philosophy. I would not deny that Cavell’s own
work stands as an extrordinary contribution to contemporary ethics. Nor would I dispute his title
as the living philosopher who has done more than any other to restore Emerson to his rightful
place in the history of American philosophy, as a thinker worthy of the highest consideration.
Still less would I discount the boldness and originality of Cavell’s readings of Emerson. What I am
contesting,  rather,  is  the  propriety  of  attaching  the  label  “Emersonian”  to  the  notion  of
perfectionism,  especially  in  view  of  its  strong  anti-metaphysical  bias.  The  Emerson  canon
provides ample grounds for rejecting Cavell’s claim as largely unsubstantiated and in a number
of crucial ways inconsistent with the moral sentiment’s firm grounding of ethics in ontology.
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